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Abstract: 
With the increase in Artificial Intelligence driven approaches, researchers are requesting 
unprecedented volumes of medical imaging data which far exceed the capacity of 
traditional on-premise client-server approaches for making the data research 
analysis-ready. We are making available a flexible solution for on-demand 
de-identification that combines the use of mature software technologies with modern 
cloud-based distributed computing techniques to enable faster turnaround in medical 
imaging research. The solution is part of a broader platform that supports a secure high 
performance clinical data science platform. 
Background: 
In order to support secondary use of data generated during the course of clinical care to 
advance the science and practice of medicine, Stanford Medicine is developing its next 
generation clinical data platform for research and related data science ecosystem 
[Datta2020]. This platform is an ecosystem consisting of a data lake (STanford medicine 
Research data Repository or STARR), a suite of analytical data warehouses and cohort 
building applications and a secure data science facility. A sampling of medical imaging 
research shows that researchers have been successful at Stanford [Varma2019, 
Patel2019, Irvin2019, Park2019, Dunnmon2019, Bien2018, Banerjee2018a, 
Banerjee2018b, Rajpurkar2018, Esteva2017] and elsewhere [Peng2020, Zhang2020, 
Gulshan2016], in applying AI approaches to imaging data to derive scientific insights. In 
parallel, national experts are charting the path of AI in medical imaging [Allen2019]. We 
expect AI research in imaging to become ubiquitous resulting in even greater demand 
for imaging data at Academic Medical Centers like ours. As a result, our new ecosystem 
has a strong focus on supporting our imaging community. 
Modern hospital environments are generating hundreds of terabytes of new imaging 
data per year. At Stanford, the radiology imaging data is growing at the rate of 450 
terabytes annually representing various different modalities (Figure 1) and often dozens 
of manufactures and hundreds of devices. The primary challenges to delivering medical 
imaging data for research purposes are acquisition, de-identification and delivery. The 
DICOM medical imaging standard [Dicom2019] is widely supported by the open-source 
community with multiple software packages available for de-identification [Aryanto2015]. 
The MIRC Clinical Trial Processor (MIRC CTP) [RSNA2019] is a popular and 
performant [Aryanto2015] open-source software package for conducting clinical trials 
with DICOM image data, and includes a comprehensive DICOM anonymizer plugin. 
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Traditional approaches for de-identifying radiology medical images involve the use of 
one or more software applications directly connected to a clinical imaging archive. 
When imaging studies are identified for research use, the anonymization software 
retrieves and de-identifies the images from the clinical archive. This approach quickly 
breaks down in scale when multiple researchers are requesting billions of images and 
hundreds of terabytes of data.  
 
 
Figure 1: A sample distribution of studies and images in Stanford Hospital picture 
archive and communication system (PACS). The majority of studies are for diagnostic 
x-ray, the majority of images are from CT and MRI devices. A single CT or MRI study 
can have thousands of associated images. 
Recently cloud computing providers have begun offering API services for text and 
medical image de-identification, however they were incompatible with our requirement 
for reproducibility and control over the de-identification process. Vendor API’s operate 
as a “black box” that changes without notice, affecting reproducibility. These APIs are in 
early stages, and can lack functionality like complete control over the replacement of 
DICOM attributes. These APIs are reassessed periodically as they mature and provide 
greater flexibility, however their proprietary nature, lack of change control and vendor 
lock-in will always present a major challenge for implementation. 
Another challenge to delivering medical image data for research purposes is that 
Stanford University Privacy Office (UPO) determines that algorithmically de-identified 
DICOM images have the potential for leaking incidental Protected Health Information 
(PHI). In order to confirm that the de-identified data has no incidental PHI, UPO requires 
the algorithmic output to be scanned by humans. While such expert determination is 
used for broader data sharing (e.g., ​https://aimi.stanford.edu/research/public-datasets​), 
it is not feasible to scan each image by eye for internal research use with hundreds of 
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terabytes of data. To address security and patient privacy at Stanford, we have built a 
secure data science facility [Datta2020] to support downstream data processing on 
petascale data. To support research needs including the use of modern deep learning 
approaches, we present a new de-identification system that combines the reliability of 
existing de-identification software with the scale of cloud-based distributed computing. 
We also decouple the data processing system from the clinical imaging archive to 
reduce any adverse impact on clinical operations. The new imaging pipeline acquires 
data on-demand from the clinical radiology archive, algorithmically de-identifies the data 
in parallel and delivers to the researcher’s secure data science workspace. 
Method: 
When de-identifying patient data, patient identifiers must be replaced by unique, 
anonymized codes, a process known as pseudonymization [Noumeir2007]. Our 
de-identification pipelines support two separate research stages. First one is pre-IRB 
non-human subject research. The de-identification aggressively strips everything that 
may have HIPAA identifiers. In this mode, the anonymized codes generated for 
non-human subject research can never be reversed and linked to identified patient data. 
Second is for post-IRB study, the researcher can request de-identified images which 
meet the HIPAA minimum necessary for the study and can additionally request links 
between the anonymized images and the original patient identifiers. 
 
We have developed an on-demand highly scalable de-identification solution in lieu of a 
single archive of permanently de-identified images to support the two distinct use cases. 
The on-demand pipeline also allows us to make continuous improvements to 
de-identification quality (i.e., reduce PHI leak) unlike a single permanently de-identified 
image archive. We will show in the Results section that our cost of de-identification is 
extremely low to support this on-demand workflow. 
 
Specifically, we have written a distributed software application (STARR-Radiology aka 
STARR-Radio) which a) forwards fully-identified DICOM image data from on-premise 
clinical systems to STanford medicine Research data Repository (aka STARR data 
lake), specifically, to an encrypted and distributed cloud object storage service, b) 
listens for de-identification requests using a publish/subscribe messaging model, c) 
instantiates an appropriate number of de-identification compute instances based on the 
size of the message queue, and d) delivers the de-identified DICOM images to an 
object store accessible to the researcher for downstream data science. Although CTP is 
designed for installation as a client-server application, it’s highly extensible nature 
allowed us to extract only the DICOM filtering and anonymizing components for our use. 
Additionally, MIRC CTP uses the dcm4che [Dcm4che2019] libraries, which provide 
support for acquiring, manipulating, and transmitting DICOM files. These two software 
components were integrated with the cloud platform that underlies the STARR data 
lake. 
A central database and server component was created to store workflow information 
relevant to the lifetime of a de-identification request. When a request for images has 
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IRB approval, an entry for the approved study is inserted in the database along with 
associated accession numbers (representing specific imaging studies for that study). 
The accession numbers are first validated as eligible for research, and if validated a 
new anonymized accession number, patient MRN, and randomized date jitter specific to 
the specific research study are created. These identifiers, combined with anonymization 
rules appropriate for the associated IRB, are transmitted to a central messaging queue. 
An auto-scaling compute pool which is subscribed to the messaging queue creates an 
appropriate number of compute instances based on the total number of outstanding 
messages in the queue and the expected delivery window. Each worker retrieves 
messages from the queue, downloads and de-identifies the DICOM files using the 
MIRC anonymization engine, and uploads the de-identified images to an object store 
accessible to the researcher. Compute instances are deleted once the message queue 
is empty, and a manifest file is created which indicates the transformations applied to 
each image, along with success or failure states. 
 
The greatest challenge encountered was creating and validating rules for reliably 
de-identifying DICOM imaging studies. While the MIRC anonymizer includes a set of 
rules intended as a starting point for further development, they are not acceptable in 
their default state [Aryanto2015]. The DICOM anonymization process (Figure 2a) is 
executed in three discrete stages: filtering, scrubbing, and anonymization. The filtering 
stage accepts or discards the image based on metadata rules. For example, the filtering 
stage removed encapsulated PDF reports, scanned intake forms, outside study alerts 
etc. If the image is not discarded, it is then passed to the scrubbing stage, which 
removes rectangular regions from the image which are known to contain PHI. Here, the 
regions of the image containing PHI are replaced by black pixels and recompressed 
using the JPEG Lossless syntax. The rules used for pixel blanking can be found on 
GitHub (​https://github.com/susom/mirc-ctp/blob/master/stanford-scrubber.script​). The 
final stage removes or replaces image metadata which is known to contain PHI. 
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Figure 2a:​ Shows the iterative cycle of adding a new supported image type to the 
DICOM de-identification pipeline.  
 
Using the DICOM Basic Application Confidentiality Profile with the Clean Graphics and 
Retain Longitudinal Temporal Information With Modified Dates options as a starting 
point (​http://dicom.nema.org/dicom/2013/output/chtml/part15/sect_E.2.html​), new 
filtering, anonymization and pixel scrubbing rules were created using an iterative 
process. Images for each modality are categorized by make, model and image 
resolution. A sample for each combination is executed against the pipeline, which is 
modified as necessary to remove PHI. After every iteration the image is added to the 
regression suite, which is then executed to ensure new rules do not break existing ones.  
 
During development regression tests were created as new rules were added to ensure 
new rules did not break existing rules. The regression tests are written using the 
Cucumber testing framework (​https://cucumber.io/​) and are human readable (Figure 
2b). 
 
 
Feature: Anonymize CT images filtering where appropriate 
 
 Background: 
  Given the pipeline uses the anonymizer 
script,"stanford-anonymizer.script" 
  Given the pipeline uses the pixel script, "stanford-scrubber.script" 
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  Given the pipeline uses the filter script, "stanford-filter.script" 
  And script parameter "accession" is "ACN123" 
  And script parameter "mrn" is "MRN123" 
  And script parameter "jitter" is "-6" 
 
  Scenario: All files in the PT/Anonymize folder should be anonymized 
    Given the DICOM directory "dicom-phi/PT/Anonymize" 
    When ran through the deid pipeline 
    Then the images SHOULD be anonymized 
 
  Scenario: REG-PCT01 GE PET/CT fusion 
    Given the DICOM directory "dicom-phi/PT/Scrub/GE/Discovery/512x512" 
    When ran through the deid pipeline 
    Then the resulting images should be scrubbed at 256,0,256,22 
    And the resulting images should be scrubbed at 300,22,212,80 
    And the resulting images should be scrubbed at 10,478,100,10 
 
  Scenario: All files in the PT/Filter folder should be filtered 
    Given the DICOM directory "dicom-phi/PT/Filter" 
    When ran through the deid pipeline 
    Then the images SHOULD NOT pass the filter 
Figure 2b:​ An excerpt of a regression test for PET/CT devices. The first scenario 
checks that all DICOM files in the directory Anonymize are modified by the 
anonymizer and jittered correctly. The second scenario inspects rectangular regions 
of the scrubbed output to ensure they are blank. The third scenario requires all files in 
the Filter directory to be excluded by the pipeline. If any of these tests fail, the 
regression test results in failure. 
 
The maturity of the CTP software itself presented unique challenges. While CTP is 
written in the cross-platform Java language, it requires libraries which utilize the Java 
Native Interface, and only run on x86 or SPARC platforms. These libraries are no longer 
supported by Oracle, and posed problems during development, requiring the use of 
Docker containerization as a compatibility layer. Additionally, the CTP software uses 
older Java technologies, such as file references instead of stream buffers. This requires 
the de-identification workers to store images in block storage attached to the OS, 
instead of networked direct data streams. The negative performance impact of block 
storage was mitigated by mounting system RAM as block storage (aka ramdisk) which 
is used as ephemeral storage during de-identification.  
Results: 
In this section, we present the performance achieved for the de-identification pipeline. A 
selection of random studies (containing one or more images) for three different imaging 
modalities were passed through the de-identification pipeline consisting of 8 compute 
instances running Google Container Optimized OS, each with 32 CPUs and 208GB of 
RAM. The de-identification application is executed within docker, using a ‘tmpfs’ mount 
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as a high-performance ramdisk. Anonymized instances which have not been filtered are 
uploaded to Google Cloud Storage and deleted from ramdisk. 
 
Studies / 
Modality 
Filtered 
Instances 
Anonymized 
Instances 
Scrubbed 
Instances 
Total 
Bytes 
Duration Aggregate 
Throughput 
Cost 
5,000 CT 2,663,139 4,997,888 56,318 3 TB 45 min 1.25 GB/s $5.68 
10,000 US 70,550 7,390 420,734 3.5 TB 60 min 977 MB/s $8.52 
100,000 X-Ray 151,096 212,882 3,662 2.3 TB 56 min 684 MB/s $7.95 
Table 1:​ Performance benchmarks for the de-identification of a random selection of 
imaging studies. 
 
The low cost of de-identification allows us to store a single copy of the identified image 
and provide on-demand de-identification as needed. 
Discussion: 
During the iterative development process it was found that certain types of images 
needed to be excluded completely as the probability for PHI leakage was high. Such 
examples include: 
 
1. Analog x-ray film which has been digitized by a film scanner. For example, all 
images with manufacturer “Vidar” are filtered by the pipeline. Scanned analog 
x-rays are highly problematic as PHI may be present at any location on the film 
(in the form of a stick or hand-written notes) and the image may be the incorrect 
orientation, eg. flipped or upside-down. 
2. DICOM files containing: 
a. Encapsulated PDF documents 
b. Structured Report (SR) documents 
c. Presentation state objects 
d. Uncommon modality attributes (eg. RAW) 
e. Secondary capture objects* 
f. Burned-in annotation is set to “Yes”* 
g. ConversionType attribute is an empty-string 
h. ImageType attribute contains DERIVED or SECONDARY* 
3. DICOM from video-capture devices 
* May be bypassed by specific whitelisting rules based on other attributes. 
 
Ultrasound devices in particular were found to be the most complex for reliable 
de-identification, followed by digital x-ray. While other modalities may occasionally 
contain PHI in the pixel data (for example CT radiation dose exposure screens), 
ultrasound almost always contains PHI in the pixel data. It is common for multiple 
regions within a single image to have pixel data that needed to be removed, which may 
be different even within the same make and model of an ultrasound device depending 
on the resolution of the image. For this reason ultrasound devices are only supported 
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via a whitelist: if there is no rule for a specific make, model, and image resolution for an 
ultrasound image, the image is filtered. 
Ultrasound make Models Resolution variations 
GE 35 151 
Siemens 13 24 
Acuson 2 14 
Philips 12 22 
Toshiba 13 24 
SonoSite 6 7 
Zonare 3 4 
BK Medical 3 7 
Aloka 7 10 
SuperSonic Imaging 1 15 
Samsung 8 16 
Table 2:​ Ultrasound manufacturers and the number of image variations per 
manufacturer found in Stanford data. An image variation represents the total number of 
combinations of model and image resolutions. For example 38 different image 
resolutions were found for the GE (make) LOGIQE9 (model) ultrasound device alone. 
Each resolution required a new image scrubbing rule, for a total of 151 different rules for 
GE devices alone. This table represents 99% of the manufacturers in the clinical 
imaging archive. 
It should be noted that certain data types, such as head images, even when 
de-identified fully (i.e., no incidental PHI) could be combined with other publicly 
available data to re-identify the original patient [Schwarz2019].  There are advanced 
techniques for skull stripping [Kalavathi2016] that should be applied if research requires 
public sharing of head imaging data.  
 
Future work: 
Future work focuses on several different areas. Firstly, we are building a DICOM 
metadata store using Google BigQuery [Datta2020] that will host metadata from raw 
identified DICOM images. A pre-IRB de-identified version of this store will be made 
accessible for cohort development. Secondly, we are leveraging our clinical text mining 
framework [Datta2020] to augment cohort development e.g. text mining radiology 
reports. Thirdly, we hope to integrate OCR and other machine learning approaches to 
improve image de-identification. Finally, we plan to generate a pre-IRB non-human 
subject dataset containing a stratified subset of imaging data that is linkable to the 
pre-IRB OMOP clinical data [Datta2020] for research acceleration. 
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